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  Endogenous financial and trade openness: political economy considerations
* 
 
by Joshua Aizenman and Ilan Noy 
 
  This paper studies the endogenous determination of financial and trade openness.  We outline a 
framework where financial openness is endogenously determined by the authority’s choice of financial 
repression as a taxation device, and where the private sector determines endogenously the magnitude of 
capital flight. The optimal financial repression is shown to depend on the openness of the economy to 
international trade, the efficiency of the tax system (which in turn may be affected by political economy 
considerations).  Similar predictions are obtained in a model where authorities pursue an opportunistic 
policy representing the interest of a narrow pressure group that engages in capital flight due to political 
uncertainty. Both models predict that larger trade openness would induce greater financial openness. The 
reverse association -- larger financial openness implies greater trade openness -- may hold due to different 
channels that are briefly discussed. Hence, we expect to find two-way positive linkages between financial 
and commercial openness.  We confirm these predictions empirically. Having established (Granger) 
causality, we investigate the relative magnitudes of these directions of causality using the decomposition 
test developed in Geweke (1982). We find that almost all of the linear feedback between trade and financial 
openness can be accounted for by G-causality from financial openness to trade openness (53%) and from 
trade to financial openness (34%). The residual is due to simultaneous correlation between the two 
measures. In our estimations for the determinants of financial openness, we focus on developing countries 
and examine a host of macro-economic and political-institutional variables as suggested in our theory. We 
find that a one standard deviation increase in commercial openness is associated with a 9.5 percent increase 
in de-facto financial openness (% of GDP), a one standard deviation increase in a democratization index 
reduces financial openness by 3.5%, and a one standard deviation increase in corruption is associated with 
a 3% reduction of financial openness.  Similar negative dependence applies for measures of political 
competition. The impact of a budget surplus on financial openness is negative for developing countries, but 
positive for the OECD.  Both the theoretical and empirical analyses lead us to the conclude, counter-
intuitively, that a more openly competitive, free and inclusive political system will lead to lower levels of 
de-facto financial openness. 
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1.   Introduction and overview 
 
Salient features of the international economy during the last twenty years are the 
growing financial integration of developing countries and recurring financial crises. 
These developments have led to contentious debates regarding the desirability of 
financial openness. Prominent economists have concluded that the gains from financial 
integration are illusive and caution developing countries against rushing towards financial 
openness (e.g. Rodrik, 1999, and Stiglitz, 2002).  Yet, other studies have provided 
tentative support for the presence of significant gains from financial openness (e.g. 
Bekaert et. al., 2002, and Henry, 2003).  These studies frequently focus on the formal acts 
associated with de-jure financial opening, such as changing regulations and the attitude 
of the central bank and the treasury to financial flows.  Yet, as has been noted by Prasad, 
Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003), de-facto financial integration is, by itself, of considerable 
interest.  Indeed, the actual level of financial openness (measured by the sum of gross 
private capital inflows and outflows) is the outcome of the interaction between market 
forces and the enforcement of existing regulations.   
The purpose of our paper is to focus on these links.  In particular, we highlight the 
endogenous determination of financial integration, showing that de-facto financial 
openness is the outcome of macro-economic, public finance and political economy 
considerations.  As we argue in the concluding remarks, understanding the links between 
the economic/political economy structure and de-facto financial integration is a pre-
condition for evaluating the challenges, risks and benefits associated with de-jure 
financial integration. 
In Section 2 we outline two polar models where financial openness is determined 
endogenously.  The first case describes a representative agent, public finance model of a 
developing country where the benevolent authorities finance a given fiscal outlay by 
means of distortionary taxes.  The second case models a scenario where authorities 
pursue an opportunistic policy representing the interest of a narrow pressure group that 
faces political uncertainty.  Interestingly, the two models provide similar predictions 
about the links between commercial openness, political economy factors and de-facto 
financial openness.   2
In the public finance model, financial openness is endogenously determined by 
the authority’s choice of financial repression, and the private sector determines 
endogenously the magnitude of capital flight.  Capital flight is intermediated via trade 
mis-invoicing, and exposes agents to the risk of interception and ultimately, confiscation 
of funds.
1  Agents view this risk as exogenous, and determine their optimal portfolio by 
weighing the gain from the higher interest rate on offshore deposits against the risk of 
confiscation.  We characterize the optimal portfolio as a function of the attitude towards 
risk, the probability of capital flight interception, and the relevant interest rates.  While 
the probability of intercepting capital flight is exogenous for the atomistic agent, it is 
endogenously determined by policies and the economic structure. Specifically, greater 
trade openness would make it easier to intermediate a given volume of capital flight.  
Hence, the probability of intercepting capital flight of a representative agent increases 
with the resources spent on enforcement relative to the trade openness, and declines with 
the magnitude of the aggregate capital flight.   
The problem facing the fiscal authorities is to fund given fiscal outlays on public 
goods relaying on two types of taxes: income tax, and financial repression.  Both taxes 
are costly: income tax is associated with collection costs, and enforcing financial 
repression requires direct expenditure on monitoring and policing trade invoices. We 
show that financial repression characterizes countries that are below a certain threshold of 
fiscal efficiency – high enough cost of tax collection would induce the implementation of 
financial repression as a means of taxation.  In these circumstances, higher tax collection 
costs, higher fiscal expenditure and lower commercial openness would increase the 
“optimal” financial repression.   
Applying the insight of Cukierman, et al. (1992), we expect that the cost of tax 
collection itself is endogenously determined.  Functioning democracies will tend to have 
more efficient tax collection systems, and thus tend to be associated with lower capital 
flight. Similarly, we expect less polarized societies and those in which conflicts are 
                                                      
1   See Giovannini and de Melo (1993) for documenting and measuring financial repression as an 
implicit tax on savings, and Kletzer and Kohli (2003) for analysis of the fiscal implications of financial 
repression in India. See Dooley (1988), Tornell and Velasco, (1992), and Dooley and Kletzer (1994) on 
capital flight as a mean of political economy risk diversification.  See Dooley (1996) for an overview of 
financial controls; and Claessens and Naudé (1993) and Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) for discussions on 
trade mis-invoicing and capital flight.   3
solved peacefully within the political system to have more efficient tax collection 
mechanisms in place, reducing capital flight motivated by tax evasion and/or 
opportunistic behavior, looting, etc. This insight guides partly our use of political 
variables in the empirical section. 
We close Section 2 with the polar case, corresponding to high degrees of 
opportunism and political uncertainty, and with a discussion of the impact of financial 
openness on trade openness. Here, first period policies are determined by a policy maker 
representing a narrow interest group that is facing political uncertainty.  Specifically, we 
consider the case where the policy maker controls foreign exchange income from 
exporting a natural resource in the first period, and faces an uncertain future horizon.  In 
these circumstances, his second period consumption would be partly determined by the 
income from first period savings, conveniently put offshore, beyond the control of the 
future regime.  Second period output of the natural resource is impacted by the tangible 
investment in the extraction of the resource.  Such an investment can be financed by the 
income controlled by the present policy maker.  We illustrate that with opportunistic 
behavior, the combination of policy uncertainty and polarization would lead to greater 
de-facto financial openness. 
In section 3 we examine empirically some of the hypotheses suggested by our 
models.   We estimate the level of de facto financial openness as a function of lagged 
trade openness, several macroeconomic control variables, and a vector of political-
institutional variables.  We apply a two-step FGLS procedure for a panel of developing 
and OECD countries for the years 1982-1998 using annual observations (the sample size 
was determined by the availability of data and by excluding off-shore financial centers).  
We find that de-facto financial openness depends positively on lagged trade openness, 
and GDP/Capita.  The budget surplus to GDP ratio is occasionally significant and always 
negative for developing countries, but positive and significant for the OECD countries.  
Including the corruption variable in our regressions also yields negative and significant 
coefficients in almost all the iterations of the model we examined, confirming Wei’s 
(2000) insight.  For the full sample (developing and the OECD) and the developing 
countries sub-samples, the effect of greater democratization is negative, significant and 
apparently large. Any one-point increase in this index (out of the 20 points difference   4
between full autocracy and democracy) reduces financial openness (international 
financial flows) by almost a one-half percentage point of GDP.  The effect is about half 
as large when we do not control for the level of corruption. 
We further investigate the political-economy nature of financial openness by 
replacing the democracy/autocracy (regime) variable with two others: a measure of 
political competition and an index of government fractionalization. For the political 
competition variable, we find that increased institutionalized competition within the 
polity decreases financial openness. As we observed before, this effect is more 
perceptible and significant once corruption is controlled for as well. We also find that the 
more a government is fractionalized (the ruling coalition includes more political parties), 
the higher is financial openness.  
The empirical results reported above suggest de-facto sequencing, where greater 
de-facto trade openness is associated with larger future de-facto financial openness.  The 
reverse association -- from financial openness to greater trade openness -- may hold due 
to different channels that are briefly discussed later. Hence, we expect to find two-way 
positive linkages between financial and commercial openness and confirm these 
predictions empirically. Having established (Granger) causality, we investigate the 
relative magnitudes of these directions of causality using the decomposition test 
developed in Geweke (1982). We find that almost all of the linear feedback between 
trade and financial openness can be accounted for by G-causality from financial openness 
to trade openness (53%) and from trade to financial openness (34%). The residual is due 
to simultaneous correlation between the two annual measures. 
Our present findings are consistent with the notion that a significant share of the 
volume of financial flows to and from developing countries are due to diversification of 
political risk, as advocated by Dooley (1988).  This interpretation may provide an 
additional explanation for our finding concerning the negative marginal association of 
democracy and financial openness. This finding also suggests that the ‘home bias’ in the 
allocation of financial assets identified by the financial literature (dealing mostly with the 
OECD countries) may be less pronounced in developing countries – i.e. it may be 
attenuated by political risk considerations affecting some developing countries. An 
alternative interpretation, however, is that more democratic countries are also associated   5
with better institutions, and thereby with higher marginal productivity of capital, thus 
reducing the incentive to buy foreign assets.  This argument suggests that the political 
economy and efficiency aspects of the governing polity, and the quality of its institutions, 
deserve more careful investigation.  All these issues are left for future research.  Section 4 
concludes the paper with further interpretive remarks. 
 
2. The  model 
We consider two polar versions of models where financial openness is determined 
endogenously.  The first is a representative agent model, of a developing country where 
the benevolent authorities finance a given fiscal outlay by means of distortionary taxes.  
The second is the case where authorities pursue an opportunistic policy representing the 
interest of a narrow pressure group that engages in capital flight due to political 
uncertainty.   
 
2.1  The public finance model 













C u V , 
where C is the consumption of the domestic good.  The production of the home good 
uses domestic and foreign traded inputs: 
 (2) 
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and k is a normalization factor,  β αβ α
− = 1
1
k .  To simplify, we normalize the prices of 
both the domestic and the foreign inputs to one.  The representative consumer starts 
period 1 with past savings of  ) 1 ( 1 1 , − − + r Si .  At the beginning of each period, the 
representative consumer is endowed with  i X  units of the domestic input.  The aggregate 
endowment is denoted by  X ,  
                                                      
2   The present model extends Aizenman and Guidotti (1994), by allowing the endogenous linkage 
between commercial and financial openness, in circumstances where capital flight is subject to stochastic 
confiscation.   6
(3)  ∑ =
i
i X X .   
The Cobb-Douglas production (2) implies that aggregate imports are 
 (4)    C β  
The fiscal authorities tax the endowment  X  and the interest rate income a rate t.  The 
consumer allocates savings between domestic and foreign bonds, S and F, respectively, 
such that 
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where  i S , 0  is savings in period zero, yielding interest rate  0 r .  The fiscal authorities 
impose capital control, leading to random interception of illicit capital flight.  Let φ  
denote the probability of intercepting agent i’s illicit capital flight, leading to 
confiscation.   Hence, the second period consumption is contingent on the success (s) or 
failure (f) of capital flight: 
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2.2 Consumer’s  optimization 
 
The allocation problem of the representative consumer is summarized by 
 (7) 
F S
C u C u








) ( ) ( ) 1 (
) (













Each consumer is small, thereby treating as exogenous the probability of capital flight 
interception.  The first order conditions associated with optimal domestic and foreign 
savings are 
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Applying (8) and (9), the equilibrium spread between the foreign and the domestic 
interest rates facing the consumer is: 
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The premium between the foreign and the domestic after-tax real interest rates 
compensates for the probability of intercepting the illicit capital flight, φ , at a rate 
reflecting the consumer’s attitude towards risk.
 3  Henceforth we use φ  as a measure of 
the de-facto financial repression.  Applying the first order conditions (8) and (9), it can be 
verified that  0 <
φ d
dFi and  0 >
dt
dFi -- higher financial repression φ and lower tax rate t 
reduce the expected yield on offshore saving, reducing capital flight.  
 
2.3 Endogenous  enforcement 
While the private agent views the probability of intercepting capital flight as 
given, the actual value is determined by the fiscal resources spent on enforcing capital 
controls, and by other macro variables impacting the efficacy of these controls.
4  We 
assume φ  to depend positively on the ratio of resources spent on enforcement relative to 
the capacity to engage in illicit capital flows. Specifically, we denote by τ  the fraction of 
endowment spent by the fiscal authorities enforcing capital controls.  The experience of 
developing countries has illustrated that exports under-invoicing and imports over-
invoicing have been important channels facilitating capital flight.  In these circumstances, 
intermediating a given volume of capital flight would be easier in countries that are more 
open to international trade.  Recalling that imports are proportional toβ , we assume φ  to 
depend positively on the enforcement/import rate,  β τ / .  We summarize the assumptions 
in a reduced form  
                                                      
3   The term Ω is the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption in the case when the illicit capital is 
intercepted, relative to the case when the authorities fail to intercept.  The premium increases with the 
probability of interception, and with the degree of risk aversion.   
4   The paper is related to the growing literature on endogenous enforcement [see Anderson and 
Marcouiller (1998) for modeling endogenous predation and trade].   8
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φ φ F   ;  where F is the 
aggregate capital flight [i.e.,  ∑ =
i
i F F ].   Higher capital flight implies fewer resources 
devoted to supervision per unit of capital flight, reducing the probability of intercepting a 
dollar of capital flight [though the total confiscation  φ F  would increase].   
The enforcement of income and interest rate taxes is associated with collection 
cost λ  per one dollar of gross taxes, implying that the net tax collected by a tax t is 
t ) 1 ( λ − .  The fiscal budget constraint in period one is: 
(12)         ) 1 ( ] )[ 1 ( 1 1 1 1 − − − − + + + = + + − r S X G S r S X t τ λ . 
The net revenue from the income tax, plus the revenue from the domestic bond sold in 
period one finances the fiscal expenditure on public good (G), plus the cost of enforcing 
capital controls, plus the repayment of old debt.  Similarly, the second period fiscal 
budget constraint is 
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The left hand side of (14) is the gross tax revenue.  It is the sum of the net present 
value of the endowment tax and the tax on interest paid on the initial public debt (the first 
term), plus the “confiscation tax” on foreign bonds,F , at the rate φ (which equals the 
probability of intercepting capital flight), plus the implicit tax on domestic bonds, at a 
rate  Γ − + ) 1 ( φ φ φ .  For a risk neutral consumer, expected yields on the domestic bond 
should match the expected yield on the foreign bond, ) 1 *)( 1 ( φ − + r .   This is equivalent to 
imposing an implicit tax on first period savings at the rate φ  (which equals the   9
probability of intercepting capital flight).
5 Risk aversion magnifies the implicit tax 
induced by financial repression -- it further reduces the equilibrium cost of the public 
debt, by  Γ − ) 1 ( φ φ .  This term is the risk premium demanded by the holders of foreign 
bonds, needed to compensate for the confiscation risk.  Unlike the private sector, the 
effective real interest rate facing the fiscal authorities equals the foreign interest rate.  The 
RHS of (14) is the net present value of government outlays, which equals the net present 
value of the public good [the first term], plus financing the repayment of the outstanding 
initial pubic debt, plus financing the enforcement of capital controls and the cost of 
collecting taxes. 
  Equation (14) is the fundamental budget constraint facing the government.  It 
defines implicitly a trade off between financial repression (as determined by the resources 
spent on enforcement) and the endowment tax:  ) (τ t t = .  The policy maker chooses the 
tax rates τ  and the corresponding t determined by (14) that would maximize the utility of 
the representative agent.   
It is convenient to normalize the endowment, and henceforth we assume that 
1 = X .   In the appendix we show that, for small changes,  
(15)
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A useful benchmark is full financial integration, i.e.  0 = τ , where 
1 *, ) 1 ( , 0 = Ω = − = r t r φ . The welfare effect of imposing marginal financial repression is 
 (16)     
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Imposing financial repression would allow reducing the tax rate t by 
τ d
dt
− , inducing a 
welfare gain equal to the drop in the tax rate times the relevant tax base.  This welfare 
gain is offset by the adverse welfare effect associated with shifting the tax burden from 
                                                      
5   In terms of (14), risk neutrality implies  0 = Γ , reducing the yield on domestic bonds to 
[] φ φ φ φ = Γ − + = Γ 0 ) 1 ( .  Note that our analysis understates the revenue from financial repression –   10
an endowment tax to taxing savings, measured by the last term on the RHS of (16).  
Applying (12) and (14) we infer that, in the vicinity of full financial integration, 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint induces the following trade off:  
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As long as  0 1
' > − τ φ S , spending on enforcing capital controls increases net revenue, 
allowing cutting the income tax rate, t.  Hence,  1 | 0
' > = τ τ φ S  is a necessary condition for 
financial repression to be considered as a viable policy option.
6   Henceforth we will 
assume it to hold.   Applying (17) to (15) we infer that  
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With a lump sum endowment tax, there are no benefits associated with financial 
repression, and the welfare effect of a dollar spent on enforcing marginal capital controls 
reduces welfare by exactly one dollar.  However, high enough collection costs would 
imply that financial repression leads to a large drop in the cost of collecting conventional 
taxes, inducing the tax authorities to add financial repression to the menu of taxes.
7  In 
these circumstances, the optimal depth of capital control is characterized by (15).  
Assuming that the cost of tax collection is high enough to induce positive but low 
financial repression, we can apply (15) and (17) to infer 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
part of it comes from taxing domestic financial intermediation.  Adding the domestic banking system 
would not affect the paper’s main results. 
6   The condition  1
' > τ φ S  indicates that the economy operates on the left side of the Laffer curve 
associated with financial repression.      11
Claim 1: 
High enough tax collection costs would induce the implementation of financial 
repression.  Under these circumstances, higher tax collection costs, λ , higher fiscal 
expenditure G and lower commercial openness would lead to increased “optimal” 











 [see the Appendix for derivation]. 
  Following the approach of Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), one expects 
less polarized societies and better functioning democracies to be characterized by more 
efficient tax collection systems [hence by lower λ ].  Applying this conjecture, a more 
efficient tax system would be associated also with a lower tax rate, t, thereby reducing the 
attractiveness of capital flight.  It can be verified that with low enough financial 
repression, the net effect of improving the tax system is to lower the incidence of capital 
flight, thereby reducing de-facto financial integration.  
Of course, de-facto financial openness is impacted by other considerations not 
addressed by the public finance model described above, such as differentials in discount 
rates and investment opportunities across countries, etc. One should view the above 
model as suggestive of possible links between macro and political economy factors and 
de-facto openness, motivating the empirical research. Yet, we do not claim that our 
empirical work summarized in the next section is a test of this model.  In fact, we argue 
that the links we identify may be attributed to other economic forces, explained by 
alternative models.  To illustrate this point, we close this section by contrasting our 
public-finance model with (arguably) the opposite case, where financial openness is 
determined by pure opportunism associated with looting.
8      
 
2.4  Political uncertainty, opportunistic model  
A fair criticism of the public finance approach described above is that it more 
accurately describes homogenous countries, where the policy maker is guided by the 
                                                                                                                                                              
7   Note that the numerator of (17) increases with the cost of tax collection, λ, whereas the 
denominator is positive for low λ, approaching zero for a large enough tax collection cost, implying that 
(17) approaches infinity for high enough λ. 
8   Russia in the early nineties may provide a good case study.  See Akerlof and Romer (1993).  See 
also Alesina and Tabellini (1989) for a model where political instability and the polarization between labor 
and capital determines the incidence of capital flight and financial openness.   12
interests of the median voter, and there is little political uncertainty pertaining to 
competing parties and competing interest groups.   Hence, it is useful to consider the 
polar case, corresponding to high degrees of opportunism and political uncertainty.  One 
expects that most countries are characterized by regimes on a continuum between these 
two polar cases.  Interestingly, we will illustrate that both approaches may lead to similar 
links between macroeconomic and political economy variables and de-facto financial 
openness.   We describe a simple model summarizing de facto financial openness under 
circumstances where policies in the first period are determined by a policy maker 
representing a narrow interest group facing political uncertainty.  Specifically, suppose 
that the policy maker controls foreign exchange income from exporting a natural resource 
in the first period, and faces an uncertain future horizon.  With probability q, a new 
government will take over in period 2, ousting the first period policy maker.  In these 
circumstances, his second period consumption would be determined by the income from 
the first period savings, conveniently put offshore, beyond the control of the future 
regime.  The second period output of the natural resource is impacted by the tangible 
investment in the extraction of the resource.  Such an investment can be financed by the 
income controlled by the present policy maker.  For concreteness, suppose that the 
situation is summarized by the following equations: 









C u  , 
where  t M  in (20)  is the surplus generated by the natural resource at time t (t = 1, 2).  
The second period surplus depends positively on first period investments, I , 
corresponding to the investment financed by the first period policy maker. 1 K  is the initial 
stock of capital. 
Equation (21) represents the utility of the policy maker.  To simplify, we assume 
that the outside party is risk neutral.  The policy maker determines the first period 
investment and saving by solving  
(22) 
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The first order conditions are  
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where  '
I M  is the marginal product of capital;  '
, 2 l u and  '
, 2 h u are the second period 
marginal utilities, for the cases where the policy maker is ousted and stays in power, 
respectively.  We can apply (23-24) to infer 
 
Claim 2 





 -- Higher probability of regime change induces the present policy 
maker to increase savings, channeling them to offshore accounts via capital flight, and to 
reduce investment, I. 
9   
Greater commercial openness associated with greater availability of natural 
resources would lead to greater financial openness, as has been the case in the public 
finance model.  This example also illustrates that with opportunistic behavior, the 
combination of policy uncertainty and polarization would lead to greater de-facto 
financial openness.
10  Note the similarity of the predictions of the opportunistic and the 
                                                      
9   The model can be extended to account for different economic structures.  For example, suppose 
part of the first period investment is financed by foreign capital.  If foreign investment today provides the 
option value of gaining greater access to the natural resource following a regime change, then higher 
probability of a regime change would increase both capital flight (by the present insider) and capital inflow 
(by foreign investors).  In these circumstances, de-facto financial openness increases with the probability of 
regime change.   
10   In this example, polarization refers to the observation that the surplus is divided unequally among 
competing parties – the policy maker controls the surplus and uses it to maximize his expected utility.  In 
this example, the political uncertainty is summarized by the probability of ousting the present regime, 
thereby shifting the future control of the surplus to anther party.  Our example illustrates that, starting from 
the case of no political uncertainty [ 0 = q ], higher probability of turnover will increase capital flight,   14
public finance approaches – in both cases, less cohesive social organization, greater 
political uncertainty and greater commercial openness are associated with higher de-facto 
financial openness.   
The above example is also consistent with the voracity effect identified by Tornell 
and Lane (1999), where competition among several fiscal claimants may intensify the 
resultant capital flight.   
 
2.5  On two way feedbacks between financial and trade openness 
 
Our discussion so far focused on the possibility that greater trade openness will 
lead to higher financial openness.  It is reasonable to expect that the linkages between 
trade and financial openness operate in both directions, and that higher financial openness 
would lead to greater trade openness.  A likely channel is vertical foreign direct 
investment. FDI allows multinationals to fragment production optimally, benefiting from 
the cost advantage associated with locating labor intensive production stages in labor 
abundant countries (Gordon et al., 2001 provide  comprehensive overview of vertical 
FDI).   A by-product of this fragmentation is the growth of two-way trade: higher imports 
of primary and intermediate products, followed by higher exports of the upgraded 
products.  Indeed, Gordon et. al.  (2001) shows that vertical FDI from the OECD to 
developing countries has increased substantially in the last twenty years.
11    
The positive association between trade and financial openness may also be the 
outcome of political economy factors, as is highlighted in Rajan and Zingales (2003).  
They propose an interest group theory of financial development whereby incumbents 
oppose financial development because it breeds competition.  In these circumstances, the 
incumbents’ opposition will be weaker when an economy allows both cross-border trade 
and capital flows.  They predict that country’s domestic financial development should be 
positively correlated with trade openness, and identify the time varying nature of this 
association.  Anther interesting approach linking trade and financial openness is Portes 
and Rey (2003), showing that both international trades in goods and in assets are 
                                                                                                                                                              
increasing de-facto financial openness at a rate that depends positively on the commercial openness of the 
economy.   15
explained by similar gravity regressions.  Their work highlights the role of information 
flows and frictions in accounting for trade in goods and assets, controlling for other 
conventional variables.   
We therefore expect to observe two-way linkages between trade and financial 
openness.  In the next section, among other things, we look at these causal links 
empirically. We first confirm the importance of lagged commercial openness in Granger-
causing contemporaneous financial openness, after controlling for macro and political 
economy variables.  Next, we show that lagged financial openness plays an important 
role in accounting for commercial openness.  We close the empirical evaluation of this 
question by decomposing the relative quantitative importance of the two channels.  
 
3.  The Empirical model 
This section reviews the data, the methodology we employ and our main results 
on the determinants of financial openness and causality between financial openness and 
commercial/trade openness.  We begin by describing the data and provide descriptive 
statistics. We next discuss the model we estimate for the determination of financial 
openness and finally examine the question of causality. Throughout, we discuss the 
empirical exercises’ relevance to the theory we developed above. Appendix B provides a 
detailed summary of the variables, sources and samples described in this section.   
 
3.1 The  data 
We measure de facto financial openness using the sum of total capital inflows and 
outflows (in absolute values) measured as a percent of gross domestic product. Capital 
flows are the sum of FDI, portfolio flows and other investments. This measure is exactly 
analogous to the standard measure of commercial openness, which we employ as an 
independent variable in our regressions.
12 
                                                                                                                                                              
11   Another channel operating in the same direction is due to the reliance of international trade on 
trade credit.  Greater financial openness tends to reduce the cost of trade credit, thereby increasing 
international trade.  
12   Wei and Wu (2002) previously used this financial openness variable. We thank Shang-Jin Wei for 
making it available to us. The data originates from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics database.  See 
also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) for insightful analysis of the net asset position of nations, based upon 
careful aggregations of the IMF’s database.      16
Tables 1A-1B describe our data for financial openness. Specifically, table 1A 
presents averages for financial openness for geographical regions, decades and the 
estimation samples we use. We find that for developing countries in general and in 
particular for Asian, African and Middle Eastern countries, financial openness decreased 
from the 1970s to the 1980s but rebounded and surpassed previous levels in the 1990s. 
This trend is most pronounced for the East Asian countries for which capital flows were 
11.2% of GDP during the 1970s, 8.5% during the 1980s and 16.5% during the 1990s.
13 
Developed economies (henceforth OECD) do not show this trend but show a continual 
increase in financial openness (from 7.3% to 9.3% to 16.8% for the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s respectively). Interestingly, Latin America shows a similar continuous trend in 
spite of the 1980s debt crisis.  
For our commercial openness index, we average the sum of exports and imports 
as a percentage of GDP over the previous 4 years (t-1 to t-4). By averaging, we smooth 
out any fluctuations due to temporary changes in the terms of trade and obtain a more 
robust finding in our multivariate analysis with respect to the temporal effect of 
commercial openness on financial openness. In addition, we also investigate the dynamic 
causal structure of the interaction between commercial and financial openness using the 
original annual data for both. 
Table 1B presents the correlation coefficients between our financial openness 
measure and the commercial/trade openness measure. Bi-variate analysis clearly shows a 
partial correlation between the two types of openness (both when commercial openness is 
measured annually and when it is averaged for the previous 4 years). Notably, the 
correlation appears to be significantly weaker for Latin American countries. The financial 
openness index measures gross capital flows. Accordingly, we also show, in column 3 of 
table 1B, the correlation of our gross flows measure with net flows (the current account). 
We find that there is only a weak and unstable correlation between the two (in some of 
our sub-samples the correlation is even negative).  
Figures 1 and 2 further describe the correlations between the financial openness 
measure, commercial (trade) openness, and the current account (net financial flows) 
                                                      
13   Our data does not completely reflect the slowdown in capital flows as a result of the Asian crisis 
as it only covers up to and including 1998.   17
across time. As previously observed, there is an apparent partial correlation between the 
openness measures, but a much weaker relationship between gross and net financial 
flows. Furthermore, the partial correlation between commercial and financial openness 
appears to be more pronounced for the 1990s than it was for the 1980s.
14 
As the previous theoretical discussion suggests, one of the determinants of de 
facto financial openness should be the legal impediments to financial flows (de jure 
financial openness). Accordingly, we include in our multivariate analysis a binary 
measure for restrictions on the capital account and/or the current account.  Both 
indicators are taken from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions. These binary measures, which we combine to make a single 0/1 
indicator of legal restrictions, are the only internationally comparable measures of de jure 
financial openness available for a large sample of countries and over the time period.
15 
For the political-economy determinants of financial openness, we concentrate our 
empirical investigation on three political-institutional measures. The motivation for 
examining political variables is twofold. First, Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) 
argue that functioning democracies will tend to have more efficient tax collection 
systems. And, in our theoretical work, we concluded that the degree of tax collection 
costs will determine the degree of financial repression. To investigate this hypothesis we 
examine whether the capacity of the political system to prevent friction (and 
consequently mediate conflicts through the political arena and facilitate more efficient tax 
and other regulatory structures), is a relevant measure. Again, we expect less polarized 
societies and those in which conflicts are solved peacefully within the political system to 
have more efficient tax collection mechanisms in place. 
First, we employ a variable that measures the degree of democratic rule. Our 
democracy index is taken from the Polity IV project and ranges from -10 (fully 
autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic).
16 In addition, we employ a variable that measures 
                                                      
14   The data cover the years 1980-1989 and 1990-1998. We do not present data for the 1970s as we 
do not have a sufficient number of observations on trade openness for that decade to allow for any robust 
conclusions. 
15   A thorough description of these data is found in Glick and Hutchison (forthcoming). 
16   The “Polity IV database includes annual measures for both institutionalized democracy (DEMOC) 
and autocracy (AUTOC), as many polities exhibit qualities of both these distinct authority patterns….A 
third indicator, POLITY, is derived simply by subtracting the AUTOC value from the DEMOC value; this   18
the degree of political competition within a polity. This index combines two dimensions 
of political competition: (1) the degree of institutionalization, or organization, of political 
competition and (2) the extent of government restrictions on political competition. 
Combined, this measure identifies ten broad patterns of political competition that roughly 
correspond with the degree of “democraticness” of political competition within a polity 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2000). As Marshall and Jaggers (2000, p. 79) note “[t]he polar 
opposite [to a competitive political system] is unregulated participation, in which there 
are no enduring national political organizations and no effective regime controls on 
political activity. In such situations political competition is fluid and often characterized 
by recurring, contentious interactions and shifting coalitions of strongly partisan 
groups” (italics ours). The 1-10 index defines steps between 1 (repressed competition –
such as in totalitarian systems or military dictatorships) and 10 (institutionalized open 
electoral participation). As we show in table 2, this variable is highly correlated with the 
democracy-autocracy measure described above even though it was constructed based on 
different criteria. 
Another political-economy variable we use to examine the robustness of our 
results comes from a political data set constructed at the World Bank (Beck et al. 2001 
and Keefer, 2002). As we hypothesized that more polarized social and institutional 
arrangements will affect the efficiency of tax collections, we use an index that measures 
the fractionalization within government. This variable is constructed from a Herfindahl 
Index for government, which is obtained by summing the squared seat shares of all 
parties in the government. Thus, a completely unified government will have an index of 1 
and a government that is composed of many small parties will have a smaller index.
17 
Following the work of Wei (2000) and Dreher and Siemers (2003), we examine 
whether corruption matters for the degree of financial openness. To that end, we use a 
measure of corruption that is taken from the International Country Risk Guide. The data 
are available in monthly observations. We obtain annual observations from 1982 onward 
                                                                                                                                                              
procedure provides a single regime score that ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy).” 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2000, p. 12). We use the POLITY variable in our regressions. 
17   This index records a missing observation if there is no parliament. If there are any government 
parties where seats are unknown, the index is also blank.  Independents are calculated as if they were 
individual parties with one seat each.   19
by averaging the monthly data points for each year. This index ranges from  -6 (low 
probability/risk of encountering corruption) to 0 (high risk of corruption). 
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients for the political variables we use. As 
noted earlier, the variable measuring political competition and the regime’s 
autocratic/democratic nature are highly correlated (correlation of 0.94). Besides this pair, 
the other political variables do not seem significantly correlated. 
In order to ensure our results are not driven by a ‘missing variables’ bias, we 
include a host of macroeconomic control variables. In all regressions we use the inflation 
rate (changes in the CPI), per capita gross domestic product (measured in PPP dollars), 
the government’s budget surplus (as a percent of GDP), and a world interest rate (proxied 
by the US Treasury Bill 1-year rate). All the macroeconomic data are taken from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2001 edition). In order to examine 
whether the occurrence of financial crises contaminates our result, as they might 
systematically change the relationship between financial openness and our control 
variables, we also include crises measures in a number of regressions. 
A priori, we see no reason to restrict our sample and therefore attempted to 
include all 205 countries and territories for which data are available in the 2001 edition of 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Our control variables, though, 
are available for only a subset of this group. Most importantly, most of the data on 
financial flows as well as the data on corruption are typically available only from the 
1980s and only for a much smaller set of countries. Our data set is therefore an annual 
panel of 83 countries for the years 1982-1998. 
We further investigate the robustness of our results by examining various sub-
samples. Notably, we hypothesize that results for OECD countries might be different 
from those for developing countries. We thus repeat our regressions for developed 
economies – which we define as those economies that were members of the OECD in 
1990. As our focus is developing countries we include most of the regression results for 
this sub-sample. These are defined by excluding OECD countries and island economies 
(as these are often used as off-shore banking centers and their level of de facto financial 
openness is often dramatically different from other countries). For a summary of the   20
information described in this section including detailed data sources and sample sizes, see 
appendix B.   
 
3.2  Methodology and Regression Results 
Based on our theoretical work, we estimate the statistical significance of various 
sources of financial repression by positing a linear structure for the determination of the 
level of financial openness whereby: 
(25)  it it it it it P CO X FO ε β β β α + + + + = − 3 1 2 1  , with  it it it µ ρε ε + = −1 . 
The dependent variable (FOit), financial openness for country i at time t, is assumed to be 
dependent on an intercept (or alternatively separate country or regional intercepts), a 
vector Xit of macroeconomic control variables, average of lagged commercial openness 
( 1 − it CO ), a vector of political-institutional variables (Pit) and an error term. The variables 
examined are described below.  
A Durbin-Watson statistic for all iterations of the model strongly indicates that the 
error terms are autocorrelated. The autocorrelation coefficient was estimated to be 
between 0.7-0.9. The error term is thus assumed to have an AR(1) structure with µ iid.
18 
We estimate the model using the Prais-Winsten algorithm. The Prais-Winsten procedure 
is a 2SLS procedure that utilizes the estimated correlation coefficient obtained from the 
Durbin-Watson statistic from the first-stage OLS regression as the initial autocorrelation 
value and reiterates a second-step FGLS till convergence (typically 2-3 iterations).
19 
 
Table 3 includes results for our benchmark regressions. For the first stage 
regression, the R
2 is between 0.20 and 0.67 depending on the exact specification and 
sample used.
20 For the second stage, the model converges very quickly (within two 
iterations) and most of the coefficients for the benchmark control variables are robust to 
the inclusion and exclusion of other variables. In column (1) of table 3, which includes 
the full sample (829 observations), we already observe many of the results that remain 
throughout the various specifications. 
                                                      
18   E(µt)=0; E(µt
2)=σu
2; and Cov(µt, µs)=0 for t≠s. 
19   For technical details see Greene (2000, pp. 546-550) and Greene (2002, E7 pp. 4-7).    21
In examining the independent variables, we first turn to our control macro-
variables. The coefficient for per-capita GDP is always significantly positive – i.e., an 
increase in GDP per capita increases financial openness (except for a regression 
containing only OECD countries in which the coefficient is insignificant). We find that 
an increase domestic per capita GDP of PPP$1000 will facilitate a 0.14 to 2.28 
percentage points increase in the volume of capital flows (as percent of GDP). The ratio 
of budget surplus to GDP is typically significant and always negative for developing 
countries. A bigger budget deficit will increase de facto financial openness. Again, this 
result does not hold for our OECD sub-sample; for this case, reported in table 3 column 
(2), the budget surplus coefficient is positive and significant.
21  The inflation rate and the 
world interest rate (proxied by the US T-Bill rate) are always insignificantly different 
from zero. But, as with the previous results, the coefficients for inflation and the world 
interest rate seem to be different for the OECD sub-sample; although these are still 
insignificant for standard significance levels, the effect of inflation on financial openness 
is larger (and negative) for the OECD countries and the effect of the US T-Bill rate is 
smaller. Both these results correspond with our intuition. We also include a binary 
variable for the 1990s and as expected given the information presented in table 1A, the 
coefficient for this variable is always positive and significant; i.e., the 1990s saw an 
across-the-board increase in financial openness (increased capital flows). This increase in 
capital flows is found to be between 1.3 and 4.9 percent of GDP. 
   Additionally, we find that the trade openness coefficient (ratio of exports and 
imports to GDP) is always positive and highly significant. As this variable describes the 
average openness over the previous four years, we find that a history of more commercial 
openness will increase financial openness significantly. This result is robust to all the 
iterations we present in table 3 and elsewhere. 
                                                                                                                                                              
20   The higher R
2 values are generally for the models that include more political/institutional variables 
and for the developing and OECD sub-samples. 
21   The disparity between the impacts of budget surplus in developing and OECD countries may be 
explained by the differential cyclical patterns of fiscal policy.  In contrast to the OECD countries, fiscal 
policy tends to be pro-cyclical in developing countries: i.e., government spending drops and taxes increase 
during recessions.  Financial crises tend to lead to recessions in developing countries, inducing abrupt fiscal 
adjustment, reducing fiscal deficits.  These observations may lead to the positive association between 
smaller budget deficits and lower de facto financial openness [see Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi 
(1996), Aizenman, Gavin and Hausmann (2000) and Talvi and Vegh (2000)].   22
Before discussing our empirical analysis of the political-economy determinants of 
international financial flows, we note that including the corruption variable in our 
regressions also yields negative and significant coefficients in almost all the iterations of 
the model.
22 Similar results from different data are analyzed in detail in Wei (2000) and 
Dreher and Siemers (2003). 
Our focii in this section are the political-economy variables. First, we examine the 
affect of the nature of the political regime on financial openness (this index is between 10 
– full democracy and –10 – full autocracy). For the full sample (table 3 column 1) and the 
developing countries sub-samples (table 3 column 3) the coefficient for this variable is 
negative, significant and apparently large.
23 Any one-point increase in this index (out of 
the 20 points difference between full autocracy and democracy) reduces financial 
openness (international financial flows) by almost one-half a percentage point of GDP. 
The effect is about half as large when we do not control for the level of corruption 
(reported in table 3 column 4).  
Since the results for the OECD sub-sample are consistently different, and our 
theoretical modeling is focused on developing countries, we give most attention to the 
developing countries sub-sample (these include all non-OECD countries that are not 
islands/financial-centers). Columns 5 and 6 in table 3 repeat our specification for the 
developing countries sample but exclude the regime variable in column 5 and both the 
regime and corruption measures in column 6. In both cases, we find that all the other 
results reported above remain robust to these omissions. 
Table 4 presents information on the quantitative significance of our findings for 
the benchmark model. For the sample of developing countries, we find that a one 
standard deviation increase in the commercial openness is associated with a 9.5 
percentage points increase in de-facto financial openness (percent of GDP), a one 
standard deviation increase in the democratization index reduces financial openness by 
3.5 percentage points, and a one standard deviation increase in corruption is associated 
with a reduction of financial openness by 3.1 percentage points. Similarly, the 
                                                      
22   Once more, this result does not hold for the OECD sub-sample (reported in table 3 column 2). In 
this case, the coefficient is still positive but insignificant. Variability of the corruption variable for the 
OECD sub-sample is much lower.   23
corresponding associations for the whole sample are 12.3, 3.1 and 2.9. Furthermore, a 
developing country will have higher financial openness (measured as 3 additional 
percentage points of GDP), were it to have the median level of trade openness of an 
OECD country; would be 2.2% less open were it as democratic as the typical OECD 
country; and 4% more open to financial flows were it less corrupt as the typical 
developed country is. 
In table 5 columns (1)-(4) we further investigate the political-economy nature of 
financial openness by replacing the democracy/autocracy (regime) variable with two 
others: a measure of political competition, and an index of government fractionalization. 
For the political competition variable, we find that increased institutionalized competition 
within the polity decreases financial openness. This result is not empirically puzzling 
considering that this variable is highly correlated with our measure of 
democracy/autocracy (even though the variable was created using different criteria). 
Thus, a more openly competitive, free and inclusive political system will lead to lower 
levels of financial openness after controlling for incomes, macroeconomic policy 
(inflation and budget surpluses), interest rates and commercial openness. As we observed 
before, this effect is more perceptible and significant once corruption is controlled for as 
well.  
For the government fractionalization index (reported in table 5 columns 3 and 4), 
we find that the more a government is fractionalized (the ruling coalition includes more 
political parties), the higher is financial openness. Quantitatively, the estimated 
coefficient of 1.4-1.9 does not seem to suggest a very large effect on the level of 
international financial flows. This result is suggestive as to the validity of some of the 
conjectures we raised in our second theoretical model. 
In column (5) of table 5 we re-estimate our benchmark specification  (table 3 
column 3) but also include the de-jure measure of financial openness. Interestingly, the 
coefficient for this binary measure of restrictions on the capital and current accounts 
combined is not significant in this specification nor in other specifications we ran. Our 
main results with respect to commercial openness and the political regime remain 
                                                                                                                                                              
23   For the OECD sample (table 3 column 2), the coefficient has the same sign and magnitude but is 
statistically insignificant.   24
significant even when the de jure measure is included; though the corruption coefficient 
is no longer significant reflecting a correlation between corruption and the decision by 
the authorities to use financial repression.
24 
  
3.3  Robustness of Main Results 
In addition to the specifications discussed above, we tested a number of 
alternative specifications of our empirical model in order to verify the robustness of our 
results. Because of space considerations we do not include the full specifications in our 
tables but all these results are available upon request. 
First, we hypothesized that financial crises (either banking or currency crises) 
might significantly affect the level of financial openness in general and more specifically 
the use of financial repression for generating government revenues. Interestingly, in all 
iterations of the model we attempted, none of the coefficients for the crises variables 
comes out significant for the developing countries sample (nor for the other samples).
25 
Second, besides including the average of past commercial openness, we also 
included in our specification the contemporaneous TRADE/GDP variable and obtained 
the following: In all cases, the lagged commercial openness variable remains positive and 
highly significant. For the developing countries sample as well as the whole sample, the 
lagged average is positive and highly significant with a now larger coefficient (0.20 and 
0.21 respectively) while the contemporaneous variable is negative and significant. For the 
OECD sample, the lagged average is still positive and highly significant while the 
contemporaneous variable is now positive but insignificant. The sum of the two 
coefficients (summarizing the effect of commercial openness both past and present) is 
                                                      
24   The same results are obtained if a binary index for restrictions only on the current (or capital) 
account is included. 
25   We utilized a number of variants of these binary indicators (currency crisis and banking crisis, 
their onset year only, and these separately or together in the same specification) and we never reject the null 
(no effect). For currency crises, our indicator is identified by periods in which an index, composed of a 
weighted average of the real exchange rate and foreign reserves, changed dramatically – by more than 2 
standard deviations. This measure is described in detail and evaluated in Hutchison and Noy (2002). The 
banking crisis binary indicator is taken from Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) and is analyzed in Arteta and 
Eichengreen (2002) and Hutchison and Noy (forthcoming).   25
0.05, 0.06, and 0.09, for the developing, OECD and the whole sample, respectively. This 
sum is always positive and highly significant for the three different samples.
26   
As the political and institutional variables we use do not vary sufficiently over 
time we do not present results for the model estimated with country effects. Typically, the 
goodness of fit is higher but the independent political-institutional variables lose most of 
their statistical significance (as would be expected). We include regional effects (binary 
variables for Latin America and East Asia) in our large and developing countries 
samples. Time effects do not provide any additional explanatory power besides a 
significant finding for the 1990s (reported above).  
 
3.4   Causality 
In the previous section we have established that past trade openness Granger-
causes financial openness (see Granger, 1969 and Sims, 1972 for a definition of G-
causality). As we suspect that causality might also run from past financial openness to 
present trade openness we also estimate the opposite specification: 
(26)  1 12 3 1 4 it it it it it it CO X FO FO P γ δδ δ δ η − − =+ + + + + 
We use the same assumptions, methodology, definition of variables and samples 
as before. Results for several specifications are reported in table 6. Our focus in this 
paper is the determination of financial openness and we therefore concentrate our 
attention on the financial openness index. In all the specifications reported in table 6 it 
appears apparent that financial openness is not only Granger-caused by trade openness 
but that financial openness also Granger-causes trade openness. These results hold 
whether we examine a one-year lag of the financial openness measure (columns 1-3), or 
4-year average of past financial openness for the various sub-samples previously 
described.  
In Granger (1969), the possibility of simultaneous causality between the two time 
series is assumed away by arguing that dividing the time series into shorter periods. This 
                                                      
26   One possible interpretation is that major recessions in developing countries (potentially triggered 
by capital flight) are associated with a drop in commercial openness, as would be the case if the drop in 
imports dominated any increase in exports. Likewise, capital flight may increase financial openness.  It is 
difficult to provide a better rationale for it without desegregating financial openness into its various sub 
accounts.   26
should enable the researcher to identify accurately the exact chronology of effects and do 
away with the correlations in the contemporaneous data series. Wei (1982), also points to 
the problems inherent in identifying causality structures for flow variables that are 
aggregated over time periods. As we employ annual data, and since financial flows 
respond quickly to exogenous shocks, it is reasonable to expect that our data will also 
contain what appears to be instantaneous causality between trade and financial openness. 
Furthermore, Granger’s (1969) approach does not allow us to estimate and compare the 
relative magnitudes of causality between the two time series.  
Geweke (1982) suggests a methodology to distinguish between (temporal) 
causality from x to y, from y to x and simultaneous causality between the two. We briefly 
describe the methodology and provide results.
27 
First we estimate the following 5 equations using a panel fixed-effects least 
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Next, following Geweke’s (1982) notation we define
CO FO F
→  as the linear feedback 
(i.e. G-causality) from trade openness to financial openness, 
FOC O F
→  as the G-causality 
from financial openness to trade openness, and 
FOC O F
• as the instantaneous linear feedback 
                                                      
27   Readers may also consult Geweke (1984) and Granger (1988). The only applications we are aware 
of which apply this methodology to macro-economic data series are Chong and Calderón (2000) and 
Calderón and Liu (2003). Other approaches to identifying causality in macroeconomics will typically rely 
on an instrumental variable methodology. An excellent book length treatment of the issue of causality in 
macroeconomics is Hoover (2001). 
   27
between the two series.
28 
, FOC O F  , defined as the total measure of linear dependence 
between the two series, is therefore given by: 
(32) 
, FOC O F O C O C O F O F OC O FFFF
→→• =++ .  
Given these definitions, Geweke (1982) concludes the following: 
(33) 
54 log[var( )/ var( )]
FO CO it it F ε ε
→ =  
(34) 
32 log[var( )/var( )]
CO FO it it F ε ε
→ =  
(35) 
21 log[var( )/ var( )]
FO CO it it F ε ε
• =  
Geweke (1982) shows that the null hypothesis (H0: F=0) can be statistically 
examined using the χ
2 distribution. In estimating (27)-(31), we started with three lags 
(p=3) of the independent variables in each regression and reduced step-wise the number 
of lags using the Akaike Information criterion. In all cases, it turned out that a single lag 
(p=1) contained all the information required to estimate the model. Consequently, we set 
p=1 throughout. Table 7 provides our results for distinguishing among the different 
channels of causality between the two series. Most of the linear feedback between trade 
and financial openness (87%) can be accounted for by Granger-causality from financial 
openness to trade openness (53%) and from trade to financial openness (34%). 
Simultaneous correlation between the two only accounts for 13% of the total linear 
feedback between the two series. 
When we repeated this algorithm using the same methodology but including in 
regressions (27)-(31) the control variables previously described (as in table 3 column 3) 
we obtained qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results for the feedback 
measures. 
 
4. Concluding  remarks 
Our analysis indicates that the de-facto financial openness of developing countries 
is a complex endogenous variable, systematically impacted by economic and political 
                                                      
28   Geweke (1982) prefers the term ‘linear feedback’. Pierce (1982), in a comment on Geweke’s 
work, argues that a more appropriate term to describe the measures defined in our equations (32)-(35) 
would be ‘G-causality.’ Zellner (1982), in another comment, argues that the word ‘causality’ should not be 
used if it is only based on statistical observed relationships rather than together with economic theory. We 
use the term ‘G-causality’ throughout, as it is more familiar to the economics profession. Hoover (2001) 
provides an extended discussion of the problems inherent with the usage of this term.    28
economy factors which include commercial openness, the political regime and 
corruption.  For the sample of developing countries, we find that a one standard deviation 
increase in the commercial openness index is associated with a 9.5 percent increase in de-
facto financial openness (international financial flows as percent of GDP), a one standard 
deviation increase in the democratization index reduces financial openness by 3.5 
percent, and a one standard deviation increase in corruption is associated with a  3 
percent reduction of financial openness (see table 4).   
We show that de-facto financial openness is the outcome of both efficiency and 
political economy considerations; hence one should be careful in attaching normative 
implications to these findings without having a good model of the economy.  Yet, the 
results reported in this paper may provide some guidelines to policymakers.  For 
example, a country that undergoes rapid commercial integration will find it impractical to 
enforce rigid financial repression.  One channel thorough which financial repression will 
be avoided is through mis-invoicing but others are also possible. Hence, the question for 
China is not if, but rather when and how to implement de-jure financial integration. Our 
results suggest that the efficacy of financial controls will deteriorate overtime as China 
joins the WTO and its trade volumes continue to increase.  
Furthermore, since de-facto financial integration is related to the level of 
corruption, our findings indicate an additional motivation for the Chinese government to 
reduce opportunities for corrupt behavior. Reducing corruption will increase Chinese 
financial integration, and, as other research has shown, will increase opportunities for 
financing of domestic investment. 
To economists that are concerned about the possibility that financial integration 
may lead to greater instability, our paper suggests that the process of democratization 
may provide the side benefit of reducing de-facto financial openness. Again, this result is 
directly applicable to Chinese concerns following the aftermath of the Asian crisis.  
While de-facto financial openness is a useful concept, it combines capital flows 
motivated by political economy considerations with those motivated by efficiency 
considerations.  A remaining empirical challenge is to disaggregate de-facto financial 
openness into its various components. Our second political-economy model, for example, 
might apply for foreign direct investment (FDI) but might not be relevant for equity   29
finance. More generally, since each type of flow can be taxed differently with varying 
degrees of efficiency in tax collection (as the first model suggests) and faces different 
degrees of expropriation risk (as the second model suggests), one can expect the 
determinants of openness for each type of flow to be different. Therefore, constructing 
different financial openness indicators using quantity data for the different types of 
financial flows (FDI, equity, official, bank lending, etc.) appears to be an obvious next 
step.   30
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Appendix A - Derivations 
  This appendix overviews the derivation of several key results. 
Equation (15) 
  Differentiating the expected utility (7) we infer that   
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Consumer’s budget constraints [(5) and (6)] imply  
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Substituting (A2) and (A3) to (A1), and collecting terms, we infer that  
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Applying the first order conditions [(8), (9)] to (A4), and collecting terms, we find  
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Note that (10) implies that  
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Equation (15) is obtained from (A7), using the fact that  τ φ φ τd d
' = . 
 
Claim 1 














1 C u d
dV
τ
 is given by (15).  Denoting the RHS of (15) by ℜ, and the optimal financial 
repression by τ ~ , the implicit function theorem and the second order condition for maximization 
imply that 












Assuming that the initial equilibrium is in the vicinity of low financial repression, we can apply 
(16) and (17):  
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Similar logic implies that  
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Appendix B – Data Sources and Samples 
Code Source  Description 
KTOTAL  IMF-BOP statistics
 a: Wei (2002) 
Sum of capital inflows and outflows 
(% of GDP) 
GDPPCPP  WDI
 b: NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD 
GDP per capita, PPP (current 
international $) 
TRADG  WDI: TG.VAL.TOTL.GG.ZS 
Sum of exports and imports (% of 
goods GDP) 
TRADGAV  WDI: TG.VAL.TOTL.GG.ZS  Average for TRADG for t-1,…,t-4 
DLCPI  WDI: FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG  Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
BDGTG  WDI: GB.BAL.OVRL.GD.ZS 
Overall budget deficit, including 
grants (% of GDP) 
USTBILL  IMF-IFS
c  Interest rate on U.S. Treasury bill 
CORRUPT  PRS: International Country Risk Guide  Level of Corruption 
d 
POLITY2  POLITY IV project  Political regime type 
e 
POLCOMP  POLITY IV project  Degree of political competition 
f 
 
HERFGOV  World Bank's political dataset  Herfindehl index for ruling coalition 
g 
KKCCAR  IMF- EAER 
h 
Binary measure for current account 
and/or capital account restrictions 
Samples (1982-1998) 
i 
ALL  All countries in the 2001 edition of the WDI (83 countries) 
OECD  OECD countries (21 countries) 
DEV 
Developing countries – defined as all countries excluding OECD countries and 
island states (60 countries) 
a The IMF’s Balance-of-Payments Statistics. 
b The World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
c The IMF’s International Finance Statistics. 
d This index runs from -6 (low probability/risk of encountering corruption) to 0 (highly corrupt). 
e The index runs between -10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic). 
f The index defines incremental steps between 1 (repressed competition –such as in totalitarian systems 
or military dictatorships) and 10 (institutionalized open electoral participation). 
g The index is constructed by summing the squared seat shares of all parties in the government. Thus, the 
index runs between 0 and 1 (a single party in the coalition). 
h The IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions; see Glick and      
  Hutchison (forthcoming). 
i Data availability further constrained our samples. Thus, the numbers reflect countries for which    
  data were available for the specifications described in table 3 columns 1-3 (but not necessarily for the   
  whole 1982-1998 time period for each country).   35
Table 1A.  Financial Openness – Descriptive Statistics 
 
 1970s 1980s 1990s All  years
Developing  countries 6.23 5.43 8.63 6.82 
OECD countries  7.34  9.31  16.79  11.50 
East Asia  11.20  8.47  16.53  12.38 
Latin  America  4.81 6.05 8.15 6.53 
Other 
a  6.21 4.89 7.10 5.93 
All 6.83  6.96  10.35  8.23 
a Other includes Africa (North and Sub-Saharan), Middle East and South Asia. 
 
 
Table 1B.   Financial Openness - Correlations 
 
Correlation of financial 
openness measure with… 
Comm. openness  




Developing countries  0.34  0.34  0.25 
OECD countries  0.39  0.37  -0.04 
East Asia  0.32  0.27  -0.23 
Latin America  0.25  0.18  0.20 
Other 
a  0.34 0.39  0.36 
All 0.39  0.38  0.23 
a Other includes Africa (North and Sub-Saharan), Middle East and South Asia. 
 
 
Table 2.  Correlation Coefficients for Political Variables 
 
 POLITY2  HERFGOV  POLCOMP 
CORRUPT  -0.26 0.12 -0.22 
POLITY2   -0.27  0.94 
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Table 3.  Benchmark Model Results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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Trade openness  














































a  0.88*** 0.86*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88***
Observations 829  222 607 694 607  768
Sample
 b ALL  OECD DEV DEV DEV DEV
t-statistics for all variables are given in parentheses. We denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 
1% with *, ** and *** respectively. 
The LHS variable is the sum of financial inflows and outflows (as % of GDP). 
Estimation using the Prais-Winsten algorithm assuming an AR(1) process for the error terms. 
For definitions of variables, see appendix B. 
a ρ is the correlation coefficient for the AR(1) process:  it it it µ ρε ε + = −1 . 
b ALL denotes the whole sample, OECD includes only OECD countries and DEV 
denotes the developing countries sample. For precise definitions see appendix B and text.   37
Table 4.  Effects of Changes in Independent Variables on Financial Openness 
  Effect of positive 
change of one standard 
deviation  
Effect of moving from the median value of 
the variable in developing countries to the 









Trade openness   12.27  9.42  2.95 
Democracy/autocracy -3.13  -3.51  -2.21 
Corruption -2.89  -3.12  4.01 
a Specification in table 3 column 1.  
b Specification in table 3 column 3. 
c From our data, the median developing country is less open to trade, less democratic and more corrupt.   38
Table 5.  Robustness - Political Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










Budget surplus  































Trade openness  





















Democracy/autocracy  -0.36* 
(-1.71) 





















 a  0.88*** 0.88*** 0.73*** 0.83*** 0.89*** 
Observations 591 673 552 635 578 
Sample
 b DEV DEV DEV DEV DEV 
t-statistics for all variables are given in parentheses. We denote significance levels at the 
10%, 5% and 1% with *, ** and *** respectively. 
The LHS variable is the sum of financial inflows and outflows (as % of GDP). 
Estimation using the Prais-Winsten algorithm assuming an AR(1) process for the error 
terms. For definitions of variables and samples, see appendix B. 
a ρ is the correlation coefficient for the AR(1) process:  it it it µ ρε ε + = −1 . 
b DEV denotes the developing countries sample.   39
Table 6.  Reverse Causality (from FO to CO) - Benchmark Model Results 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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a  0.91*** 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.86*** 0.89***
Observations 965 269 696 670  642
Sample
 b ALL OECD DEV DEV  DEV
t-statistics for all variables are given in parentheses. We denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 
1% with *, ** and *** respectively. The LHS variable is the sum of exports and imports (as % of GDP). 
Estimation using the Prais-Winsten algorithm assuming an AR(1) process for the error terms. For 
definitions of variables, see appendix B. 
a ρ is the correlation coefficient for the AR(1) process:  it it it µ ρε ε + = −1 . 
b ALL denotes the whole sample, OECD includes only OECD countries and DEV denotes the developing 
countries sample. For precise definitions see appendix B and text.   40





Percent of overall 
linear feedback
 b 
From financial openness to commercial 
openness (
FOC O F
→ )  0.27*** 53 
From commercial openness to financial 
openness (
CO FO F
→ )  0.17*** 34 
Simultaneous causality between financial 
and commercial openness (
FOC O F
• )  0.06*** 13 
** represents rejection of H0: no causality, at the 1% significance level based on a χ
2 test as in 
Geweke (1982). 
a As defined in equations (33)-(35). 
b As percent of the total linear feedback between the two time-series as defined in equation 
(32).   41
Figure 1 
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